a reminder that medical errors have been estimated to account for up to 98,000 deaths annually in the United States at a cost to the US healthcare system of $24 billion per year. 2 According to Brennan et al., 3 1.5 jumbo jets would need to crash every day for an equivalent death rate, making ''medical errors'' a leading cause of death in the United States.
Although it is easy to agree that medical errors must be reduced, significant challenges remain regarding error reporting, management, and prevention. Recent studies suggest that cognitive errors, a subset of medical errors involving faulty thought processes and subconscious biases, are important contributors to missed diagnoses and patient injury. 4 According to Groopman, ''Technical errors account for only a small fraction of incorrect diagnoses and treatments. Most errors are mistakes in thinking.'' He goes on to say that these thinking mistakes are caused in part by subconscious processes, such as biases we may not even recognize, and certainly not admit. 5 In the 1990s, early pioneers of the ''crisis resource management'' paradigms at Harvard and Stanford Universities introduced this topic by including fixation error, or ''tunnel vision,'' in their curricula. This is, indeed, a cognitive error, and likely a very common one. Today, the psychology of decisionmaking is becoming ever more appreciated, as vaster descriptions of a variety of cognitive errors have now been described in safety culture industries and many medical specialties, including internal medicine, emergency medicine, family practice, radiology, neurology, and even pathology.
''I never make stupid mistakes. Only very, very clever ones.'' -John Peel
How People (Even You!) Really Think
Historically, there has been a notion that making a mistake is shameful, diminishing a person's worth and undermining their expertise. Admission of mistakes may lead to loss of respect, loss of employment, and even result in legal punishment. However, fallibility is not equivalent to stupidity. 1 In fact, Pulitzer Prize winning author Joseph T. Hallinan, an expert on human perception pitfalls, asserts that the same qualities that make us efficient (e.g., rapid pattern recognition in lieu of detail scrutiny) also make us error prone; thus the mechanisms by which we perceive, process, and remember actually set us up to make mistakes. As well, he asserts, humans have significant capacity for self-deception and/or delusion. We are prone to bias and are poorly calibrated, meaning that our perception of our performance rarely approximates our actual performance. We tend to hold fast to old strategies that work poorly in new situations, and rely upon memories that are much less accurate than we realize 6 (Supplemental Digital Content 2, http://links.lww.com/ASA/A201).
Studies consistently show that people, including doctors, tend to overestimate their capabilities and remain very certain of decisions even in the face of irrefutable evidence to the contrary. [7] [8] [9] We attribute favorable personal characteristics (talent, intelligence, dexterity) to our successes, yet blame circumstances for our failures. 7 Whether or not we are personally prepared to be open to our own fallibility factors prominently in our potential ability to avoid and manage these kinds of thought process errors.
Studies consistently show that people, including doctors, tend to overestimate their capabilities and remain very certain of decisions even in the face of irrefutable evidence to the contrary.
What Exactly Are Cognitive Errors?
Naturally, erroneous thinking can be due to lack of information. However, this discussion focuses on cognitive errors-mistakes rooted in faulty subconscious thought processes. These kinds of errors are distinct from knowledge gaps because the thinker possesses adequate information and understanding of the subject matter to arrive at the correct conclusion. Simply put, cognitive errors are mistakes that are made despite ''knowing better.'' Cognitive errors are thought process traps that are ubiquitous human experiences, usually linked to failed biases or heuristics (simple decision-making strategies, or ''rules of thumb,'' that use incomplete information and ''fast and frugal'' approach) (Supplemental Digital Content 3, http://links.lww.com/ASA/A202). Medical educators will find the scenario in which a trainee underperforms in simulation or a clinical case familiar; yet it is clear that they can recite the proper management steps for the specific circumstances. Some cognitive obstacle is preventing execution of the correct behaviors, despite the presence of information and skill. It is noteworthy that heuristics and biases are frequently useful in clinical medicine; they allow experts to arrive at decisions quickly and (usually) accurately. Indeed, in a number of situations in which some relevant information is unknown or must be estimated from samples, simple heuristics have been demonstrated to be more accurate than standard statistical methods that have the same or more information. 10 However, cognitive error arises when these subconscious processes and mental shortcuts are relied upon too heavily, or under the wrong circumstances.
Because cognitive errors are rooted in subconscious processes, we are often unaware of their influence. According to Kida, humans believe strongly in anecdotes, demonstrating a powerful preference for stories over statistics and a tendency to ignore the concepts of chance and coincidence. 11 The human brain subconsciously reshapes and enhances memories as time goes by, and then we rely on these faulty memories to shape future decisions. People seek to confirm what they already believe and gloss over contradictory evidence. We tend to oversimplify or misinterpret complex situations. While there is a plethora of science and documentation of evidence to these points, we humans continue to repeat the same errors of thinking.
11 Figure 2 illustrates some of these influences on our decisions. Note that ''experience'' is deliberately in quotes, since our perceived past experience is colored by all the same influences on our current decision-making, and is therefore not entirely matched to reality.
SPECIFIC COGNITIVE ERRORS IN ANESTHESIOLOGY
Experts rely heavily on cognitive shortcuts and intuitive processes, especially when making high-stakes decisions under time pressure; this thinking environment may be particularly prone to cognitive error. 9, 12 Anesthesiologists must often make decisions under these environmental circumstances, both during routine practice and during management of emergency situations. Table 1 summarizes important examples of cognitive errors; a few examples are discussed in more detail below.
Premature Closure
Premature closure describes the cognitive error of accepting the first plausible diagnosis before it has been fully verified. This is closely linked to pattern recognition and other heuristics that allow for rapid decision-making without generating an exhaustive differential diagnosis with each occurrence, particularly for common phenomena. For example, some subscribe to the adage that the top three items on the differential diagnosis for intraoperative tachycardia are: (1) light anesthesia, (2) light anesthesia, and (3) light anesthesia. This is likely to be true a great majority of the time (after all, ''common things are common''), and it would be time consuming and possibly distracting to consider the very vast comprehensive differential diagnosis for tachycardia. However, we are remiss if we do not at least engage in the mental query: ''What else could this be?'' Feedback Bias ''Feedback bias'' is another cognitive error that may be particularly pertinent to anesthesiology. This describes the process that occurs when significant time elapses between actions and consequences, or when outcome data are never reported back to the physician (the primary team refers corneal abrasions directly to ophthalmology, central catheter infections are handled in the intensive care unit, unintended awareness is referred to psychiatry). When important information does not return to the decisionmaker, it is impossible to shape future decisions based upon that information. As such, the absence of feedback is subconsciously noted as positive feedback (''No news is good news''). This lack of accurate calibrating information further compounds our propensity toward memory shifting.
Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias is an error characterized by seeking confirming evidence to support a diagnosis while discounting disconfirming evidence, despite the latter often being more definitive (Supplemental Digital Content 4, http://links.lww.com/ASA/A204). Sometimes this will manifest by ''cherry-picking,'' or trying to force data to fit a desired or suspected diagnosis. This may be linked to external forces or ''high-stakes'' decisions. The anesthesiologists may find themselves looking for evidence to support cancelling a case they do not feel good about, or hoping to reassure themselves that the patient is acceptable for surgery despite several ''borderline'' test results, because of significant institutional pressure to proceed with the case. Indeed, one survey of anesthesiologists revealed that 49% had made an error as a result of production pressure, including accepting inadequate workup, accepting contraindications, and inadequate monitoring. 13 These anesthesiologists either willfully committed malpractice (unlikely) or convinced themselves that they were making acceptable decisions (more likely).
Availability Bias
Availability bias is an error in diagnosis due to an emotionally memorable past experience. These are the experiences by which physicians sometimes say they have ''been burned,'' and these memories make the diagnosis readily available at the forefront of the mind. When this error occurs, the physician may subconsciously ignore important differences between the current presentation and that prior experience. In a slight variation, this bias affects novices by bringing to mind the novel, unique, or otherwise striking disease that they have recently studied.
Omission Bias
Omission bias is the tendency toward inaction rather than action, out of fear of failure or being wrong. In the operating room environment, ''group think'' can contribute heavily toward this, especially if others do not agree with the proposed diagnosis or treatment. This may be especially likely when dramatic maneuvers are required (placement of a chest tube or a tracheotomy), or when a significant authority gradient is perceived (as with a less experienced anesthesiologists and a very senior surgeon) or is real (as may be the case with a surgeon directly supervising a nurse anesthetist, without an anesthesiologist). Omission bias is linked to the (flawed) perception that harmful actions are somehow worse than equally harmful omissions.
PREVENTION AND RECOVERY STRATEGIES

What Can Be Done to Prevent Cognitive Errors?
Cognitive errors are considerably less tangible than procedural or factual errors. They are described as ''lowvisibility,'' rarely witnessed or recorded, usually with low awareness on the part of the thinker, not conducive to root-cause analysis, yet potentially highly preven table. 14 Before we can do anything to prevent errors, we need to understand why we make them. Reducing cognitive errors depends upon a few distinct but related Feedback bias Significant time elapses between actions and consequences; lack of outcome data reporting. Absence of feedback is subconsciously processed as positive feedback. The greatest of faults is to be conscious of none-Thomas Carlyle
Confirmation bias
''Believing is seeing'': seeking confirming evidence to support a diagnosis while discounting disconfirming evidence, despite the latter sometimes being more definitive. I will look at any additional evidence to confirm the opinion to which I have already come-Lord Molson
Availability bias
Error due to an emotionally memorable past experience (usually negative); subconsciously ignoring important differences between the current presentation and that prior experience. Nothing fixes a thing so intensely in the memory as the wish to forget it-Michel de Montaigne
Omission bias
Tendency toward inaction rather than action, out of fear of failure or being wrong. May be especially likely when a significant authority gradient is perceived or real. The man who makes no mistakes does not usually make anything-Edward Phelps
Commission bias
Tendency toward action rather than inaction, even when those actions are unindicated or founded on desperation.
You will do foolish things, but do them with enthusiasm-Sidonie-Gabrielle Colette
Sunk costs
Phenomenon during which the more effort and commitment invested toward a plan, the harder it may become psychologically to abandon or revise that plan. Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results-Albert Einstein
Anchoring/fixation
Focusing on one feature exclusively, at the expense of comprehensive understanding. This may lead to misdiagnosis of a single problem, or missing concurrent diagnoses by focusing on just one. He who has a one-track mind, his train of thought often becomes derailed-Arthur Blank
Framing effect/unpacking principle
Allowing early presenting features to unduly influence decisions, particularly as related to transfer of care from one person or team to another.
An error does not become truth by reason of multiplied propagation-Gandhi
Overconfidence/denial Inappropriate boldness, misplaced certainty of abilities. Refusal to acknowledge a dire situation when faced with it. Heavily represented in quality assurance investigations, lawsuits, and ''morbidity and mortality'' conferences.
11
Thinking you know when in fact you don't is a fatal mistake-Bertrand Russell
Outcome bias Judging a decision on the eventual outcome, rather than the merits of the decision at the time it was made All's well that ends well.
factors: self-awareness, metacognition, and cognitive debiasing strategies. Increased self-awareness is imperative (Supplemental Digital Content 5, http://links.lww.com/ASA/A205). Studies of unconscious mental influences demonstrate that increased self-awareness leads to better management of these cognitive distortions. 7 How can we increase our selfawareness about our own errors? Although error blindness presents an inherent challenge, one strategy is the systematic and deliberate reflection upon one's thoughts, forecasts, and predictions to reveal inherent biases.
1 A self-guided ''debriefing'' at the conclusion of each case or each day is one way to accomplish this, though it requires routinely challenging one's own decisions and rationale with a good deal of skepticism.
Reducing cognitive errors depends upon a few distinct but related factors: self-awareness, metacognition, and cognitive debiasing strategies.
Second, because no single strategy of decision-making is appropriate for every situation, selection of thought strategy must be deliberate, and less automatic. Our brains are pluralist: we can carefully analyze and reason through options, and we can make intuitive ''gut instinct'' decisions. A crucial step toward avoiding error is figuring out which brain system is best for a given circumstance. Should we trust our intuitions or calculate the probabilities? Have we considered the true base-rate, or are we allowing anecdotes to inflate or deflate the prevalence of a particular problem? We must be thinking about how we think, and considering the specific environment in which we are thinking. 15 This process is called metacognition.
Third, we must employ de-biasing strategies in our metacognitive practice, which have been shown to reduce the impact of subconscious tendencies on decision-making. Some strategies are as simple as active contrarianism, and others as challenging as cultivating an open mind and mental flexibility. 16 Basic features of metacognitive practice include recognition of limitations of memory, ability to mentally ''step back'' and appreciate a broader perspective, good capacity for self-critique and harnessing overconfidence, and the ability to select specific strategies for best decision-making. We should all engage in deliberate self-checks, asking the questions: ''Am I using the best decision-making strategy right now?'' ''Am I relying too heavily on pattern-recognition or bias?'' The routine practice of forcing the brain to be less certain, and treating predictions as provisional works-in-progress, should be employed at all times.
1 Table 2 describes some strategies to support decision-making, and the associated assumptions and limitations of each, incorporating the work of Berner and Graber. 9 The strategies described in Table 2 can be considered ''generic'' strategies, as they may be ubiquitously useful practices. Still to be developed in our specialty are contextspecific strategies. As an example borrowed from radiology, ''systemic deconstruction'' is a specific strategy used to combat confirmation bias. The radiologist reads every chest film in the exact same systematic way, reporting on all structures and findings, whether positive or negative, regardless of the study indication or clinical question asked. Further work is needed in anesthesiology to develop these situation-specific strategies to manage cognitive errors in pitfall-prone contexts.
CONCLUSIONS
Cognitive errors are a subset of medical errors involving faulty thought processes and subconscious biases, and are important (and likely underappreciated) contributors Expensive, time consuming, requires formal educational setting *Note that this strategy does not apply to cognitive errors, as it addresses knowledge deficits. However, it is likely to be important in reducing medical errors. Interestingly, a controversial meta-analysis by Choudhry et al. 17 found that 70% of studies demonstrated a negative association between length of time in practice and several measures of good physician performance. At the least, there is not irrefutable evidence to suggest that increased years of practice results in better outcomes. Adapted from Berner and Graber. to missed diagnoses and patient injury. Study of the behavioral psychology of decision-making offers strategies for preventing and managing these kinds of errors, and should be embraced by anesthesiologists. Self-awareness and self-reflection are important components of metacognitive practice, which is a crucial element of practicebased learning. Research is needed to identify contextspecific de-biasing strategies for anesthesiologists.
